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Knowledge How in Philosophy of Action  
JENNIFER HORNSBY  
Abstract  
I maintain that an account of knowledge how to do something—an account which might be 
supposed to uncover “the nature” of such knowledge—can’t be got by considering what 
linguists might tell us is expressed in ascriptions of knowing how in natural language. Attention 
must be paid to the knowledge that is actually being exercised when someone is doing 
something. I criticize some claims about ascriptions of knowledge-how which derive from 
contemporary syntactic and semantic theory. I argue that these claims can no more provide an 
understanding of what it is to intend to do something than of what it is to know how to do 
something. Philosophy, not linguistics, must be the source of such understanding. 
 
 
Gilbert Ryle said that his opponents, the intellectualists, had ‘for the most part ignored 
the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks’. Ryle blamed their 
lack of attention to this question on their holding a mistaken view of what it is to act 
rationally.1 Anti-Rylean intellectualists of today don’t ignore the question that Ryle said 
his opponents ignored. Indeed they advance a definite thesis about the nature of 
knowing how to do something (of how to perform tasks, as Ryle put it). If their 
understanding of knowing how commits them to a view about acting rationally, then 
they find no problems with it. 
 I’m going to be concerned with connections between the questions what it is to 
know how to do something and what it is to act rationally (as Ryle put it2). My focus will 
be on work by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson.3 Their joint paper (2001) makes  
use of resources from linguistic theory to put in place the thesis that ‘knowledge-how is 
simply a species of knowledge-that’—is knowledge of propositions. What it is to do 
something is not at issue in that paper; but Stanley’s elaboration and book-length 
defence of the thesis (2011) makes contact with philosophy of action. And when it 
comes to Williamson’s paper (AoK)—the last of the pieces in my sights—, philosophy of 
action is firmly in the frame; although knowing how to is absent from it. Williamson 
                                                     
1  The Concept of Mind, 1949. At p.15 in the 2009 edition published by Routledge. 
2  I take Ryle‘s ‘acting rationally’ as meant to locate the kind of action in which rational beings 
participate as such—intentional action as most people nowadays would probably say. Ryle’s 
‘perform tasks’ carves out an area smaller than what’s at issue, given that ‘task’ is not naturally 
applied to much of what we do as agents. I settle here for ‘do something’ although it has an opposite 
sort of fault, carving out a larger area that what’s at issue specifically in philosophy of action. (See 
further n.7.) 
3  References below are to the following:  
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001): ‘Knowing How’. Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–44;  
Stanley (2011): Know How, Oxford, Oxford University Press;   
Stanley (2011a): ‘Knowing (How)’, Nous 45(2), 207–238;   
Williamson ‘Acting on knowledge’, to appear in J.A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), 
Knowledge-First, Oxford,  Oxford University Press. Quotations here are from a draft available at: 
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/35834/KfirstCarter.pdf 
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relies there upon an an understanding of ‘intend to’ which (as I shall explain) is caught 
up with the understanding of ‘knowing how to’ derived from the theory which was the 
basis of the joint paper. I think that such understandings are inimical to a correct 
philosophy of action. My overall aim is to show that contemporary linguistic theory is no 
basis for a credible story of action in which knowing how could belong.  
 
1.  I start from a generalization about knowing how to do something which Stanley 
and Williamson themselves endorse. As I see things, Stanley and Williamson’s single-
minded attention to questions about the syntax and semantics of sentences used to 
attribute knowledge how ensures that the significance of their own generalization is lost 
on them. It is given expression by Stanley when he formulates the following schema.4 
(IAK) If x intentionally Φ-s, then x knows how to Φ. 
(IAK) seems right. One is apt to say that a person could not have done something 
intentionally if she didn’t know how to do it. And a further connection between the 
ideas of intentionally doing and knowing how to do can also be agreed on all hands.5 
The only things which are candidates for things which a person could know how to do 
are those that she might intentionally do. 
 I’ll come back to the relation between the schema (IAK) as it stands and the sort of 
intuitive justification for it that I’ve just given. But first I bring out its implications for 
what knowing how to do something may involve.  
 It is often assumed that the word ‘intentionally’ or ‘intentional’ can serve to pick 
out what needs to be treated in an account of human agency. A certain line of thought 
may put this assumption in place—that a particular kind of explanation is proper to 
cases of human agency, namely reason explanation; and that that which, and only that 
which, someone has done by virtue of having a reason to do it, she has intentionally 
done.6 What (IAK) suggests is that a different line of thought could lead to the same 
place: that which and only that which someone has done by virtue of knowing how to 
do it she has intentionally done. Insofar as the two lines of thought converge, knowing 
how to have done appears to go hand in hand with having had a reason to do. One 
might account for this by pointing out that when a person’s having done one thing 
rationally explains her having done some other thing, then doing the other thing was 
how she did the one. Thus: that she Φ-d explains why she -d, and -ing was how she 
Φ-d—she Φ-d by -ing. 
 This little account of the manner in which knowing how to do connects with the 
having of reasons to do can hardly be adequate as it stands, however. For one thing, it 
                                                     
4   (IAK) is a consequence of what Stanley and Williamson say at pp.414–5 in 2001. I quote it from 
Stanley 2011a), p.217 (although I have replaced Stanley’s ‘F’ with ‘Φ’ in order to signal that instances 
of the schematic letter are verbs).  
5  See 2001, p.415, where it is said that what makes it clearly false that if Hannah digests her food, 
then she knows how to digest her food is that ‘digesting food is not the sort of action that one knows 
how to do’.  
6  The line of thinking is present in much philosophy of action taking off from Donald Davidson’s 
1963 paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy 60(23), 685-700. Davidson held 
that any action had a reason explanation—a ‘rationalization’ in his sense.  
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simply passes over the ‘know’ of ‘know how to do’. For another thing, the ‘by’ of ‘Φ by 
ing’ falls short of the ‘how’ which introduces the idea of the means employed in 
getting something done. You may have broken the eggs because you were making a 
cheese omelette; but you didn’t make the omelette simply by breaking eggs. If you 
made a cheese omelette, then you did so by breaking eggs and whisking them, grating 
the cheese in readiness, pouring the mix into a hot pan, and … , — by doing all of these 
things, each in turn.  
 The two points—about knowledge, and about the need to do a series of things in 
order to get done what one has reason to do—are connected. When someone has Φ-d 
(intentionally7) by first doing one thing, then another, then a third, a fourth .., the fact 
that she has Φ-d is not a matter merely of her having done each of the things in turn. 
She knew what sort of things to do because she knew how to Φ. Certainly her doing any 
of the things she did in sequence can be reckoned a part of her Φ-ing. But she had no 
reason to do any of the specific things she actually did except insofar as, in appropriate 
conjunction with doing other things, doing them would subserve her end.  
 When one thinks of an agent as setting off with knowledge of how to Φ, and as 
knowing that there are steps to be taken, it becomes easy to imagine that her Φ-ing 
must be a matter of her carrying out a plan or programme whose details were settled at 
the start. But an agent’s question how to do something doesn’t lapse as soon as she 
starts on doing it. It is not as if someone who made a cheese omelette had first thought 
out how that was to be done, and then, having determined how, set her body onto 
automatic pilot so that the several intentions she had formed would be executed in 
turn. No. One’s intentions themselves take on new specifications even in the course of 
their being fulfilled. She knew to get the frying pan out, but in practice how to do so 
depended upon where it had last been put. She had intended to scatter the cheese she 
had grated ahead of folding the omelette, but only at the point of introducing the 
cheese did determinacy attach to how much of the cheese to use. Of course someone 
who knows how to make an omelette will have no need, in the course of making it, to 
dwell upon such questions as are implicitly answered by an agent who keeps track. Still, 
one’s knowledge how to make an omelette ensures that one can be alive to what one is 
doing if ever one engages in omelette making. So the series of particular steps someone 
took in exercising her knowledge on some actual occasion is not matched to any 
inflexible routine.  
 It is hard to say much of a general sort about what goes on when someone puts her 
knowledge how to do something into practice. And there is a danger, consequent on 
needing to be explicit about what an agent must have known, to falsify the 
phenomenology, making it seem that she must consciously have known it all. At any 
rate, I won’t try to say more than starts to show up in the particular mundane example. 
                                                     
7  I leave the word ‘intentionally’ out in what follows, taking it to be everywhere implicit. Williamson 
avails himself of a means of ensuring it is implicit when he announces ‘Here and henceforth, “action” 
is to be read as “intentional action”’. It can help to see why it should be possible to leave the word 
out if one accepts, with G.E.M. Anscombe, that ‘the term “intentional” has reference to a form of 
description of events’ so that ‘descriptions of events effected by human beings’ may be formally 
descriptions of executed intentions’. See Intention, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1957, pp.84 and 87. 
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The point of the example is only to draw attention to the fact that when an agent has 
done that which she intended to do, a much more detailed story could in principle be 
told about the knowledge how which actually she had used. For the agent herself, the 
question what to be doing next is always the question how to proceed as things now 
stand. In thinking close up about a particular example, one sees how much more has 
been going on when someone has done something than would come to attention in any 
explanation of her doing it which would ordinarily be given. (IAK), in portraying knowing 
how to as co-ordinate with intentionally doing, may remind one of just how much 
knowledge of how to act is in play in action. In order to bring this out, one needs to 
advert to the perspective of the one who knew what was going on—who, in exercising 
her knowledge of how to do what she did, knew what she was doing so long as she was 
doing it.  
 I have relied on (IAK), taken from Stanley and Williamson, in order to motivate 
thinking about the knowledge how that is actually exercised when someone does 
something. But I should note two discrepancies between Stanley’s (IAK) and what I have 
tried to make from it. They used the schematic letter ‘Φ’ whereas I have relied on the 
‘something’ present in the ordinary language of ‘do something’.8 And whereas I have 
stuck to the past tense, for the sake of explaining why one might endorse (IAK) and for 
thinking about an example, their schema on the face of it is present tensed: ‘She φ-s’. 
Well, I take it that so far as tense is concerned, they actually mean something generic: 
one imagines the conditional, ‘x intentionally φ-s, …’ as falling in the scope of an implicit 
‘At any time’. But if so, then the use of a schematic letter in making a connection 
between ‘intentionally’ and ‘know how to’ might encourage one to focus on some single 
verb phrase as providing the whole of an answer to the question what someone is now 
intentionally doing. One would then be bound to fail to appreciate that at any time, the 
answer to the question what someone is doing may be ‘many things’. She is now 
pouring egg mix into a pan, and she is now making an omelette, and she is now 
preparing dinner. She knows how to do all these things if (IAK) is correct. Indeed if she’s 
doing these things now, then there must be other things she knows how to do than any 
she is now doing.  
 
2.  Stanley‘s interest in what he calls ‘the folk notion of knowing how to’ leads him to 
confine his attention to ascriptions of knowledge how. Here are some of the things 
knowledge of how to do which are ascribed to the agents in Stanley’s book: field a fly 
ball, do the Salchow, swim, ride a bicycle, change a light bulb, get to Boston, grasp a 
                                                     
8  When P.F. Strawson argued that fear of Platonism should not be a reason to disallow that 
quantification into predicate-position is a feature of natural language, his examples were taken from 
the language of agency. (See ‘Positions for quantifiers’, Semantics and Philosophy, ed. M.K. Munitz 
and P.K. Unger, New York: New York University Press, 63–79, 1974.) It will be evident that I welcome 
Strawson’s view that ‘staying close to the surface structure of natural language sentences [is] .. 
always to be aimed at if we seek to understand our own understanding of the structure of our 
language’.(For this, see the Introduction to Entity and Identity: And Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, in which the 1974 essay is reprinted.) But it will be important that the things 
we speak as if there were when we say that someone did this that or the other “thing” are not 
properties (as Strawson seems to have supposed they were). See further the Appendix. 
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door knob, post a card into a slot.9 There is certainly variety here, ranging from kinds of 
know-how which it requires a skill to possess, kinds which perhaps need no skill but may 
need to have been learnt, and a more mundane kind which most able-bodied people in 
our social circumstances can be expected to have, or readily to come to have, without 
any special instruction. The variety goes hand in hand with differences as to what might 
be at issue if it were in question whether someone knew how to do something. 
Depending on the sort of know how in question, different sorts of interest will attach to 
whether someone has it. If one learns that X knows how to swim, then one comes to 
know that there are things X might do which a non-swimmer would never do. If one has 
been told a walkable route to the museum, which no doubt can be told by rehearsing 
some facts, then knowing already how to walk, one may use what one’s been told in 
getting to the museum oneself. Any ordinary ascription of know how to X is made on 
the assumption that X has plenty of other knowledge, both of the knowledge-that and 
the knowledge-how kinds. 
 An application of (IAK) revealed that in the actual business of getting things done, a 
person makes use of much more knowledge how than would come to attention in 
thinking about what it might be said that she knew how to do (§1). And consideration of 
the actual use of sentences in which it is said that a person knows how to do something 
now reveals that an interest in the truths conveyed in such sentences is not in the first 
instance an interest in knowing what states a person is in.  
 At one point Stanley asks ‘Why should one expect it to be a virtue of an account of 
knowing how that it is plausibly taken to be what is expressed by ascriptions of knowing 
how in natural language?’. He then imagines a challenge from someone who thinks that 
‘science could show us that states of knowing how are very different in kind from what 
ordinary speakers use sentences like “Ana knows how to swim” to express’ (p.143). But 
in order to put it in question whether an account of knowing how can be confined to 
uncovering the structure of sentences in which knowledge how is ascribed, there is no 
need to speculate about whether scientists might postulate a kind of knowing how 
unfamiliar to the folk. Stanley and Williamson themselves say that ‘intentional actions 
are .. employments of knowledge-how’ (pp.442–3). If that is right, and if one aims to 
provide an account of the nature of knowledge-how, then one surely needs to think 
about its employment. Stanley has a view about its employment. Employing one’s 
knowledge how to do something, Stanley thinks, is a matter of being guided by one’s 
knowledge how to do it. His claim against Ryle is not only that knowing how to do 
something amounts to knowing a fact, but that someone’s acting amounts to her being 
guided by her knowledge of facts. (See e.g. p.175. That we are ‘guided by our 
knowledge’ of how to do things is a recurrent theme in 2011.) 
 
3. Let me turn to the argument Stanley and Williamson gave for saying that 
knowledge how to do something is propositional knowledge. It starts from the thought 
that the word ‘how’ of ‘know how’, belongs with question words, including ‘when’, 
‘where’, ‘what’, ‘who’, .. , etc.. In such sentences as ‘A knows [how —]’, ‘A knows [when 
                                                     
9   The examples are scattered throughout Stanley 2011. I’ve imposed a sort of ordering, starting 
from things that require some skill.  
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—]’, ‘A knows [where –]’ .., the ‘[how —]’s and the ‘[when —]’s and the ‘[[where —]’s 
are treated as embedded questions in standard semantics. So the knowledge attributed 
to A in such a sentence is knowledge of the answer to a question—the question ‘How —
?’, ‘When —?’ .. . A sentence may goes into the slot ‘—’ following the question word (as 
in ‘She knows how alcohol affects the body’). But in sentences that are of particular 
interest in a debate about knowing how to, there will be a verb in the infinitive in that 
slot (as in ‘She knows how to set the thermostat’, and, for that matter, ‘She knows what 
to do next’).  
 Where an infinitive comes after the question word, a sentence has to be 
constructed from the infinitive if something propositional is to be got. That means that 
the verb φ has to be supplied with a subject, and it has to be made finite so as to be 
predicable of the subject. Take as example ‘Hannah knows how to swim’. Stanley and 
Williamson use the linguists’ unpronounced pronoun ‘PRO’ as its subject, inheriting its 
reference from its antecedent (‘Hannah’ here); and they make the verb finite using a 
modal auxiliary such as ‘could’. Thus for ‘Hannah knows how to swim’ Stanley at one 
point has ‘Hannah knows how she could swim’, which he says is ‘a natural paraphrase of 
“Hannah knows how to swim”’ (114). The putative paraphrase does away with the 
infinitive, but it still contains the ‘how’. So there is more work to do in linguistic theory. 
The idea then is that Hannah’s knowing how she could swim is a matter of her being 
acquainted with some specific way or ways of swimming w, and knowing that w is a way 
she herself can or could swim—a way that will give her counterfactual success in 
swimming.10 
 One might wonder why someone who knows ways of doing something should 
need, if she is to know how to do it, also to know propositions concerning those ways. It 
is as if Stanley thought that in addition to knowing ways, one needs to know something 
else knowledge of which will guide one in doing it. Stanley appears to think that 
knowing propositions follows somehow from knowing ways. He says:  
What we assert when we assert of a skilled outfielder that he knows how to field fly balls 
is that he knows all of a range of relevant ways that give him counterfactual success in 
fielding fly balls. Hence, to say of an outfielder in baseball that he knows how to catch a 
fly ball is to impart [sic.] to him knowledge of many propositions of the form ‘w is a way 
for him to field a fly ball’. (p.183). 
                                                     
10  Here I’ve put together some different formulations in Stanley. It is unclear when he means to 
expose linguistic structure merely, when to provide the sort of analysis a philosopher may seek, 
when to give full-dress semantics. The idea of counterfactual success is present in the propositions 
which he claims are known by someone who knows how to do something. But I take it that his 
account of linguistic structure would require the introduction of a modal verb (with a meaning 
somehow slightly different from that of plain ‘can’ or plain ‘could’), which a philosopher might  want 
to explain in terms of counterfactual success. (I note that accepting that so-called counterfactual 
success is a necessary condition of knowledge-how in itself does nothing to favour the idea that 
knowledge-how is propositional. The ‘counterfactual success’ condition might be spelt out saying: ‘If 
S knows how to φ in circumstances C, then S would φ if she tried to φ in C.’ When Katherine Hawley 
introduced the condition in her ‘Success and knowledge how’ (American Philosophical Quarterly 
40(1), 19–31, 2003), she was quite explicit that endorsing it ‘leaves open the question whether 
knowledge-how is distinct from propositional knowledge’ (p.20).) 
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The ‘hence’ here effects a transition from knowledge of ways of fielding fly balls to 
knowledge of propositions, or facts, about those ways. In explication, Stanley says: 
That the acquisition of a skill is due to the learning of a fact explains why certain acts 
constitute exercises of skill, rather than reflex. A particular action of catching a fly ball is 
a skilled action, rather than a reflex, because it is guided by knowledge [sc. of facts]. 
(p.130) 
But why should an explanation be needed of why certain acts constitute exercises of 
skill?11 If intentional actions are .. employments of knowledge-how (to quote Stanley 
and Williamson once more), then X’s catching a fly ball was X’s employment of X’s 
knowledge how to catch a fly ball. No more is needed to see X’s catching of a fly ball to 
be the exercise of a skill. Someone who knows how to do something, whether or not 
this is something she knows by virtue of having acquired a skill, may, when she is in a 
position to do it, simply exercise her knowledge how to. She is in no need of further 
knowledge which will guide her. (I note that ‘exercise’ is the word which Ryle used 
wherever Stanley would have ‘is guided by’. And Ryle spoke of knowledge how as a 
capacity. It may be that Stanley’s speaking of knowledge how always as a disposition 
ensures that he has no use for the idea that it may simply be exercised, despite his 
occasionally allowing that it may be ‘employed’.12) 
 
4. When Stanley introduces knowledge of propositions about ways, the idea that the 
infinitive ‘to φ’ of ‘know how to Φ’ gives way to a sentence having ‘PRO’ as its subject 
rather gets lost sight of. But the idea recurs. For in Stanley’s theory, the unpronounced 
element PRO is assumed to be the subject of infinitival clauses generally; Stanley speaks 
of ‘the widespread consensus that infinitival constructions .. are expressions of de se 
attitudes’13 (p.72). Thus a theorist of the linguistics to which Stanley subscribes will say 
                                                     
11 Stanley often writes as if doing anything required skill. He sets out saying that ‘an action manifests 
skill in virtue of being a manifestation of the agent’s knowledge how to do it’ (2011, p5); and he 
sums up his view saying that ‘knowing how to do something is a kind of propositional knowledge 
that guides skilled actions’ (p.150). It may be that Stanley’s focus on skilled action is owed to his 
imagining an opponent who, save for cases of skill, would make no objection to his treatment of 
‘know how to’. But objections to the idea that a person’s knowing how to do something amounts to 
her possession of knowledge of propositions which guide her actions need not derive from any 
particular view of skill. (It is true, however, that Stanley is committed to a view about the acquisition 
of a skill—that it’s a matter of gaining evidence providing one with the realization that certain 
propositions are true of oneself. This has been found objectionable in its own right.) 
12 Ryle must take some of the blame for Stanley’s assumption that someone’s knowing how to do 
something can happily be called a disposition. For Ryle himself subsumed capacities in an 
overarching category of dispositions. When Ryle said that ‘there is at our disposal an indefinitely 
wide range of dispositional terms’ (op. cit. n.1, p.109), he took the range to be as wide as he did 
because among his ‘dispositional terms’ were some of the terms he applied to what he called 
capacities. Ryle’s terminology is owed to his thinking that he could account for capacities as “multi-
track dispositions”. Still, Ryle never spoke of anything both as a disposition and as exercised. 
13 A de se reading of a pronoun is one which ‘involves a first-person way of thinking’. So when de se 
pronouns make an appearance in linguistic theory, the first personal character of ascriptions of 
intentions is unearthed from the structure of sentences. I hope that §1 above made it plain that an 
account of action must be an account of a sort of first person thinking—that someone who intends 
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that a ‘PRO’ is present in the underlying syntax not only where an infinitive is preceded 
by a question word—as in ‘John knows how to hit a ball hard’ or ‘Mary knows when to 
add the cheese’—, but also where there is a simple infinitive, as in ‘John tried to win the 
race’ or ‘John wants to become a doctor’. Inasmuch as Stanley and Williamson’s 
treatment view of ‘know how to’ goes hand in hand with a view about sentences 
containing ‘try to’ and ‘intend to’, it will evidently have repercussions for philosophy of 
action beyond any I have so far touched on. The repercussions are worth exploring. 
There is no need to subscribe to any particular theory of infinitives to think that the 
same sort of construction is found following ‘know how’ and such words as ‘try’, ‘want’ 
and ‘intend’. Even from the standpoint of superficial syntax, connections between such 
infinitives are evident. These infinitives can co-occur in sentences, apparently in 
construction one with another. Consider: ‘Someone who did something that she 
intended to do knew how to do it.’ Or: ‘If someone knows how to do something, then it 
will be no accident if her trying to do it should be her actually doing it.’14 
 When Stanley argues that a full sentence must stand in place of an infinitival 
construction following ‘tries’ or ‘wants’ ‘or ‘intends’, he takes ‘try’ as his test case. In 
accordance with the consensual view, ‘John tried to win the race’ is to be written ‘John 
tried PRO to win the race’, and according to the propositional theory which Stanley 
endorses, this is to be understood as saying ‘John stands in the trying relation to a 
proposition about John’ (p.76). Really? It is hard not to notice that ‘stands in relation to’ 
is mismatched for tense with ‘tried’: perhaps Stanley meant to write ‘John stood in the 
trying relation to’. But how are we to understand the putative proposition to which John 
stands, or stood, in relation? It is about John, and it is expressed with a sentence whose 
subject is ‘PRO’ referring back to John. One wants to know what is predicated in the 
sentence. The only clue Stanley gives as to how ‘win the race’ is to be inflected for tense 
or otherwise made finite is given when he treats a different sentence and speaks of 
‘assuming that the meaning of the infinitive “to win” .. is equivalent to the modal “will’’ 
(76). But suppose now that John has won the race: that which he tried to do, he did. In 
that case, it would seem that the proposition about John to which John stood in “the 
trying relation” is one to which he also stood in a “doing relation”. But ‘John won the 
race’ surely does not say that John stands in relation to a proposition about John.  
 It is not surprising that we are at a loss to know what proposition it could possibly 
be to which someone stands in relation by virtue of trying, or having tried, to do 
                                                                                                                                                             
to so-and-so is someone who could (in principle) knowingly say ‘I intend to so-and-so’. I take the 
representation of first person thought to be a topic in its own right which can be explored otherwise 
than by fathoming English syntax. 
14 Stanley says that ‘No commitments about the meaning of infinitivals are needed to defend the 
view that knowing how to do something is a species of propositional knowledge’ (p.71). In order to 
separate his defence of his view about infinitivals from his defence of his propositionalism about 
knowing how to, Stanley presents a schema whose validity he claims suffices for demonstrating that 
knowing how to do something is knowing something to be the case. But he does not say how the 
schema—which has ‘knows how to φ’ on one side, ‘knows that’ on the other, and ‘iff’ between—
might itself be defended. (I note that however the schema might be supposed to be supported, it 
relies upon the idea that if a way to do something is known, then a proposition about that way is 
known.) 
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something. There are no intelligible sentences of the form ‘She is trying that —’ or ‘She 
tried that —’ from which to seek illumination. It might be thought that ‘try to’ is 
somehow to be exempted from the usual treatment of infinitives. ‘She intends that —’ 
is intelligible; and so perhaps is ‘She wants that —’ (or at least ‘She wants it that —’). 
Perhaps then a philosopher can join the linguists’ consensus about infinitival 
constructions but set ‘try to’ aside as somehow exceptional. 
 It is true that English (even if not other languages) allows the construction ‘intends 
that —’. Still any view about ‘intending to —’ which is the counterpart view of Stanley’s 
view of trying can hardly be in better standing than Stanley’s. For ‘intend to’ and ‘want 
to’ share with ‘try to’ the feature that makes a difficulty for the idea that there is some 
proposition to which one stands in relation by virtue of one’s trying to do something. 
That which one may intend to do or want to do, like that which one may try to do, one 
may also simply do. Mary, who intends to eat the whole pie, is doing what she intends if 
she is eating the pie, and she will have done what she intended when she has finished it 
off. But eating the pie, even eating it until it’s finished, is surely not a proposition. 
(‘Mary ate the whole pie’ expresses a proposition. But that Mary ate the whole pie is 
not what Mary did.) The fact that one may do what one intends to do apparently makes 
a problem about taking the ‘to do’ of ‘intend to do’ as holding a place for a proposition. 
 I think that this is a genuine problem. I want to show that it infects the view of 
intention held by Williamson. Williamson’s view is present in a paper which explores an 
analogy between knowledge and action by pursuing an analogy between belief and 
intention. I shan’t here be concerned with the analogies or with Williamson’s general 
view of the practical: I attend exclusively to the account of intention there. The account 
evidently derives from views about sentence structure found in the sort of 
contemporary linguistic theory he first applied to the case of ‘knowing how’ in his paper 
with Stanley. This is the theory which I think can only lead a philosopher of action 
astray.  
 
5. On the face of it, Williamson’s analogy between belief and intention is hindered by 
the fact that declarative sentences ordinarily follow the word ‘believe’ but ordinarily 
don’t follow the word ‘intend’. On the face of it, to compare the contents of beliefs with 
the contents of intentions is not to compare like with like. The point is slightly obscured, 
thanks to Williamson’s giving the name of verb phrases both to phrases that contain 
finite verbs such as ‘melted the butter’ and to infinitival verb phrases such as ‘to melt 
the butter’. But however that may be, Williamson thinks that there is no real hindrance. 
He says that if ‘intend’ is followed by a verb phrase, ‘the verb phrase still needs a 
subject’. And ‘[I]n “one intends to φ”, the unpronounced implicit subject of ‘to φ’ is 
mandatorily co-referential with “one”’. Here Williamson shows himself as signed up to 
the consensus that infinitival constructions are expressions of de se attitudes.  
 Thus Williamson takes the syntax of the sentence ‘John intends to have a drink’ to 
be given when it is written ‘Joei intends PROi to have a drink’. The English version of this 
is: ‘Joe intends himself to have a drink’. Presumably the ‘himself’ which replaces the 
linguists’ ‘PROi’ is supposed to be an indirect reflexive such as is found in ‘Joe believes 
that he himself is clever’—a sentence which signals that Joe’s is the sort of belief one 
has about oneself. But since Joe is like the rest of us in knowing who he is, that which 
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Joe intends when he intends to do something—unlike that which Joe intends when he 
intends Mary to do something—is just what Joe will have done if Joe’s intention is 
fulfilled. There seems to be no scope for an indirect reflexive here. 
  Williamson acknowledges that one might be bothered by a mismatch between the 
words we actually use in attributing intentions and those we should use if we stuck to 
the letter of his account. We simply don’t say ‘She intends herself to so-and-so’ when 
she intends to so-and-so. Williamson’s response is to provide an explanation of the 
difference between ‘Joe intends to have a drink’, which sounds normal enough, and ‘Joe 
intends himself to have a drink’ which carries a suggestion that Joe may have suffered 
brain damage or some such. He says that the difference between them ‘is a non-
semantic conversational effect, predictable on quite general grounds. .. If a speaker 
envisaged a normal case of Joe intending to have a drink, then going to the trouble of 
adding the redundant word “himself” would be pointless and prolix, thereby violating 
Grice’s conversational maxim of manner.’ Well, this obviously cuts no ice with someone 
who questions the syntactic theory, and who thinks that ‘to have a drink’ as it follows 
‘intends’ lacks a subject. Doubting that infinitival verb phrases always need a subject, 
she thinks that ‘himself’ is simply absent from ‘Joe intends to have a drink’. 
 Williamson speaks of finding no evidence against the ‘assumption that the objects 
of intentions are as propositional as the objects of belief’. But there is more at issue 
than whether ordinary ways of talking count against his assumption. If the assumption 
were correct, then not only would a subject be implicit in ‘to have a drink’ but 
something would be predicated of that subject. Yet Williamson, no more than Stanley, 
tells us how ‘to have a drink’ is to be made into something predicable of ‘PRO’/’himself’. 
A simple way to move from ‘intend to have a drink’ to ‘intend himself —’ would be to 
say ‘Joe intends that himself have a drink’. But insofar as ‘have a drink’ is here 
subjunctive, no proposition is expressed by ‘Himself have a drink’.15 Is it then that Joe 
intends that himself be having a drink, or that himself will be having a drink, or that 
himself will have had a drink? Less implausible than any of those perhaps is that Joe 
intends that himself will have a drink. But suppose that Joe has just now finished having 
a drink: he intended to have one, his intention didn’t lapse, and it is just now fulfilled. 
That which he intended can hardly now be that he himself will have a drink (although I 
suppose Joe might already have decided to have another drink).  
 When Williamson speaks to the success conditions for intentions, he writes as 
follows: 
[T]he success condition for an intention to bring it about that P is that one brings it about 
that P, not merely that somehow or other P. If you intend to open the door, but the wind 
blows it open before you can get there, your intention failed, because you did not do 
what you intended to do. 
Two points about the ‘to bring it about that p’ here are striking. (1) It is infinitival, so 
that Williamson has departed from his official view, perhaps because of the difficulty 
there is about manufacturing a propositional intention out of one expressed with an 
                                                     
15   I assume that one needs a truth-evaluable sentence, with an indicative verb, to express a 
proposition. That assumption appears to be in place in Williamson when he seeks ‘a declarative 
sentence’ in place of a verb phrase so as to have intentions’ contents match those of beliefs.  
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infinitive. (2) It introduces ‘bring about’, so that ‘to open the door’ is equated with ‘to 
bring it about that the door is open’. Of course there is something right about what 
Williamson says. Very certainly if the door is open (at a time) you cannot fulfil an 
intention you have to open it (then). And if the wind blows the door open, then the 
wind’s action is very likely to put a stop to your intention. If you intend to open the 
door, there can be no question of the wind fulfilling your intention. Indeed when 
Williamson allows that you may or may not do what you intended to do, he seems to 
recognize that you will fulfil your intention to open the door only if you open the door. 
But someone who is able simply to open the door would appear to have no need to 
intend to bring it about that the door is open. 
 When it comes to an intention to bring it about that p, it seems impossible to say 
anything general about what might need actually to be done in order to have success in 
such an intention. The certain thing is that no-one can intend to bring anything about 
unless she is able to simply do some things intentionally. It seems impossible then that 
someone should ever have intended to bring anything about unless there were things 
she could both intend to do and was able simply to do (as most of us are able e.g. simply 
to open doors). So whatever one might be able to bring about, the fact that 
propositions are not the kind of things one is able simply to do matters. It will ensure 
that ‘intend that—’ could not possibly always record what is said with ‘intend to φ’. 
 
6. I want finally to come full circle. I haven’t gone into very much detail about the 
treatment of sentences containing ‘know how’ and ‘intend’ that Stanley and Williamson 
provide on the strength of current linguistic theories. But I’ve only meant to put aspects 
of their treatment in question. In §1, I suggested that when one attends to the 
knowledge how which is actually exercised in doing something intentionally, one won’t 
think that an account of such knowledge could be got from attending to the grammar of 
sentences used when knowledge how to do something is ascribed to someone. And so I 
think it is for an account of intention. Williamson writes ‘Sometimes, even though one 
φs and intends to φ, one does not intentionally φ. A would-be assassin may accidentally 
run over and kill the man he intends to kill, without intentionally killing him.’ Indeed. It 
could be that the explanation why the would-be assassin did not intentionally kill his 
intended victim is that the knowledge how he exercised when he accidentally ran him 
over was not knowledge how to kill him. This explanation is in keeping with Stanley and 
Williamson’s own (IAK). 
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Appendix 
I’ve raised questions both for Stanley and for Williamson about how verbs are supposed to give 
way to predicates when infinitival clauses are transmuted into something propositional. One 
reason, I suspect, why we don’t find an answer to these questions is that no consideration is 
given to the behaviour of the verbs whose infinitives occur in sentences they wish to treat. This 
comes out, I think, when Stanley considers a rival to his own propositionalist approach to 
‘intend to’, ‘try to’ and ‘want to’. (J. Stanley, Know How, 76–80.) 
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  The rival Stanley considers he calls a predicational approach. On that approach, ‘try’, ‘want’ 
and ‘intend’ are ‘essentially relations to properties’. And Stanley thinks that there is something 
going for the predicational approach prima facie. He says that it explains why a certain inference 
should be ‘intuitively valid’—an inference he sets out as follows: 
(P1) John tried PRO to win the race. 
(P2) Everything John tried, Sue tried. 
 (C)  Sue tried PRO to win the race. 
The first question must be whether we do have something intuitive here at all. Do we even 
understand (P1), which purports to contain a sentence following ‘tried’ lacking any predicate? 
Might we be allowed to consider the English sentence ‘John tried to win the race’, which we do 
understand? When this is allowed, the sentence which in conjunction with it will deliver the 
conclusion that Sue tried to win the race will be ‘Sue tried to do everything that John tried to 
do’. And here we’ve surely recorded the inference that Stanley took to stand in need of 
explanation.  
 There is a different sort of inference for which Stanley’s own (P2) is well suited. It’s an 
inference exemplified in the move from (B1) and (B2) to C**. 
(B1) John tried the Pecorino.  
(B2) Everything [on the cheeseboard] John tried, Sue tried. 
(C**) Sue tried the Pecorino.  
Stanley evidently fails to distinguish ‘try’ as it is followed by (e.g.) ‘to win the race’ and ‘try’ as it 
is followed by (e.g.) ‘the Pecorino’. It appears that he fails to see that ‘try’ takes complements of 
two different sorts. Not only that: he relies upon his readers failing to see that ‘want’ likewise 
takes two (at least). When he makes his case for his own propositionalism, Stanley says that it 
alone can explain the invalidity of the argument from (1C) and (2C) to (3) 
(1C) John wants to become a doctor.  
(2C) John’s mother wants everything John wants.  
(3) John’s mother wants to become a doctor.  
But this argument is very obviously invalid. And its invalidity is easily explained: (1C) has an 
infinitive; but (2C) cannot be heard as saying that John’s mother wants to do everything that 
John wants to do: in (2C) the ‘everything’ would never be understood as quantifying over things 
that are such as to be done.  
 On the predicational approach that Stanley treats as a rival to his own, the ‘everything’ of 
his (P2) quantifies over properties. (P1) is then supposed to amount to ‘John stands in the trying 
relation to the property λx(x wins the race)’. Well, a property is surely not the object of ‘try’ in 
‘Someone tried to do something’. It is true that someone might be said to try to have a 
property. If Sammy tried to be quiet, for instance, then the property of being quiet (had by one 
who is quiet) might be said to be something that Sammy tried to have. Stanley, however, was 
not dealing with ‘to be quiet’ but with ‘to win the race’. And win the race is not something one 
might try to have, although it is something one might try to do.  
 Even though the idea that an ‘everything’ might introduce quantification over anything 
except for properties is not on Stanley’s horizon, he nonetheless acknowledges the need to 
insert an elided ‘to do’ in his (P2). He says that both his own propositional approach and the 
predicational approach need ‘special pleading’ to justify the introduction of ‘to do’. But no 
special pleading is needed when it is recognized that properties, unlike things that may be done, 
are such as to had, and that things a person may do, unlike properties, are such as to be done. 
Stanley follows the linguists in speaking only of properties. But a difference between properties 
and things that may be done has to be recognized if it’s allowed that the tense and aspectual 
behaviour of what is predicated must be brought into account. 
N.B. In this draft, the footnoting and manner of citing differ from that of the published version.   13 
  One starts to see the difference between properties and things people do when one 
appreciates that whereas a property is such that the following can be said of how it stands to an 
object: will be had by (in the future), is had by (presently), was had by (in the past), a thing a 
person may do is such that the following can be said of how it stands to a person: will be being 
done by or will have been done by (in the future), is being done by (presently), has been being 
done by or has been done by (in the past). (I don’t suggest that predication should be explained 
in terms of the having of properties or the doing of doable things, but only that differences in 
possibilities of predication should be recognized.) 
 Thanks to what he takes to be special pleading, Stanley allows himself to write (P2) as 
(P2*):  
(P2*) Everything John tried PRO to do, Sue tried PRO to do. 
And at the end of the day, it is (P2*) which is supposed to reveal John as ‘standing in the trying 
relation’ to a proposition about John. Which proposition is never specified, as I said in the text. 
When one finds oneself at a loss to discover anything predicable of PRO, one can’t help but 
wonder why ‘PRO’ should have made an appearance at the start, in Stanley’s (P1). At any rate, 
the ‘PRO’s which Stanley introduced magically disappear when Stanley comes to his evaluation 
of the predicational approach.  
  When the ‘PRO’s disappear from the account, the question why they should ever have 
been introduced becomes urgent. Consider then Stanley’s argument for a propositional, rather 
than predicational, reading of his (15). 
   (15)  ‘John wants [PRO to become a doctor], but his mother doesn’t want that’.  
Stanley says ‘what John’s mother doesn’t want is that John becomes a doctor, where the ‘that’-
clause clearly denotes a proposition about John’. But suppose that the ‘PRO’ had never been 
inserted. Instead of (15), one would have ‘‘John wants to become a doctor, but his mother 
doesn’t want him to’. This would be the natural thing to say, I take it. And Stanley makes no 
case for the de se pronouns independently of subscribing to the theories in which they are 
introduced. 
  Williamson for his part claims that any difference between his ‘Joe intends himself to φ’ 
and the English ‘Joe intends to φ’ is explained in pragmatics (§5). Will he say that ‘Joe believes 
himself to be clever means the same as the unsayable sentence ‘Joe believes to be clever’? 
 
In the matter of ‘knowing how’, Stanley also recognizes a rival to his own propositionalism. He 
says ‘The alternative view of knowing how treats knowing how to do something as a relation to 
an activity rather than as a relation to a question meaning’ (p.141). Here he forgets that one 
might be said not only (e.g) to know how to swim (an activity) but also (e.g.) to know how to 
swim to the far shore (an act). An ‘activity’, Stanley says ‘is presumably just a property’ (p. 146). 
I think that Stanley’s assimilation of verbs to predicates expressing properties stands in the way 
of his seeing what the options really are. But there is another reason why Stanley doesn’t take 
seriously what he calls “the” alternative. He thinks that an account of ‘know how to’ must go 
hand in hand with an account of ‘know when to’, ‘know where to’, etc., and he imagines that 
someone who wanted to defend any alternative to his own account would confine themselves 
to an account specifically of ‘know how to’. But someone who thought that ‘How to φ?’ could 
be so to speak a subjectless question (a question one could put to oneself without making 
actual mention of oneself) would want to allow that there are other such questions: ‘Whom to 
show this to?’, ‘When to stop arguing?’, ‘Where to go next?’. 
 
